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ABSTRACT
This Note explores the incentives and preferences of shareholders in
takeovers. This analysis is conducted in the context of the Delaware
Chancery Court’s February 2011 decision in Air Products &
Chemicals v. Airgas. In that case, the court’s decision largely turned
on whether certain short-term and long-term shareholders have
different preferences and incentives in takeovers. This Note adopts a
similar focus but frames the question in terms of whether Hedge
Funds, shareholders perceived as short-term motivated, and
Institutional Investors, shareholders perceived as long-term
motivated, evince different preferences and incentives in takeovers.
This Note’s analysis relies on both academic inquiries into the
shareholders’ investment strategies and empirical data about the
shareholders’ actual investment choices. This Note also compares
and contrasts its findings with existing academic takeover analysis.
Overall, this Note finds limited evidence of similarities between
these shareholders’ incentives and preferences in the takeover
context.
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INTRODUCTION
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Air Products &
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas Inc.1 presents a distinct turn in poison pill
doctrine. One important question before the Airgas court was how long
a target company could maintain a poison pill as a defense against an
unsolicited merger attempt.2
Previous Delaware state court
jurisprudence established that the threat of uninformed shareholders
tendering into an inadequate bid was a legitimate threat justifying the
maintenance of a pill.3 Airgas presents a distinct turn from this line of
1.
2.
3.

1995).

16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
Id. at 113.
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384–85 (Del.
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cases. The court held that the threat of a large number of merger
arbitrageurs tendering into an inadequate bid, thereby destroying
shareholder wealth, justifies the maintenance of a pill.4 Through this
decision, the Airgas court drew a distinction between short-term and
long-term shareholder interests in takeovers, and relied on these
shareholders’ disparate economic incentives as the crucial factor
permitting maintenance of a pill.
This Note reviews the Airgas court’s analysis and considers
whether Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors5 have sufficiently
dissimilar preferences and incentives in takeovers to justify different
treatment for Unocal purposes.6 Part I describes the Airgas decision.
Part II examines Hedge Funds’ general investment strategies and how
they affect takeovers. Next, Part III considers Institutional Investors’
general investment strategies and how they affect takeovers. Part IV
compares and contrasts the broader economic interests of Hedge Funds
and Institutions and finds limited evidence of similarity. Part V
discusses the impact of these findings on previous analysis by legal
scholars and courts about what takeovers should be allowed. Finally,
this Note concludes by discussing other considerations affecting
takeover jurisprudence.
I. AIRGAS, ARBITRAGEURS, AND UNOCAL
Part I introduces the Unocal standard governing enhanced judicial
scrutiny for defensive measures in takeovers. Next, it examines the
Airgas court’s application of that standard. Finally, this part explores
the Airgas court’s reservations about its conclusion.
A. THE UNOCAL STANDARD
As a defensive measure against a hostile bid, the maintenance of a
poison pill is evaluated under the familiar Unocal standard.7 To satisfy
enhanced Unocal scrutiny of defensive measures, a target board must
4.
5.

Airgas, 16 A.3d at 111–13.
Throughout this Note, the term Institutional Investors will be used
interchangeably with Institutions.
6. Parts II, III, and IV of this Note explore in depth how Hedge Funds are
different from Institutional Investors, and vice versa, on the basis of the typical
investment strategies of each type of investor and the economic preferences and
incentives that result from such strategies.
7. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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show that: (1) “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and (2) any response to that
threat “[was] reasonable in relation.”8 “Directors satisfy the first part of
the Unocal test by demonstrating good faith and reasonable
investigation” in their determination that the bid constituted a threat.9 In
addition to showing the reasonableness of their process, the board must
also articulate a legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness.10
Under the second part of the Unocal test, courts evaluate whether the
board’s response to the threat was disproportionate, meaning
“draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive.”11 If not, the court
then determines whether the board’s actions fell “within a range of
reasonable responses to the threat” posed.12
B. AIRGAS
In Airgas, the Airgas board faced a series of unsolicited all-cash,
all-shares merger bids from Air Products and refused to redeem its
poison pill for over a year.13 From the time Air Products first
approached Airgas until the day this case was decided, Airgas shares
ranged from $41.64 to $71.28.14 Even though the tender offers reached
as high as $70 per share, Airgas’ majority-independent director board
believed that the offers were inadequate.15 The board believed that the
company was worth $78 per share, relying on three reports by
independent financial advisors.16
Applying the first prong of the Unocal test, the Airgas court
identified the articulated threat as “inadequate price” and “the fact that a
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 955.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990).
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 301 n.8 (Del. Ch. 2000).
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). A
defensive measure is coercive if it is “aimed at ‘cramming down’ on its shareholders a
management-sponsored alternative.” Id. at 1387 (citing Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v.
Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55(Del. 1990)). A defensive measure is preclusive if it
“makes a bidder’s ability to wage a successful proxy contest and gain control either
‘mathematically impossible’ or ‘realistically unattainable.’” Carmody v. Toll Brothers,
Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389).
12. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367.
13. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,16 A.3d 48, 55–56 (Del. Ch. 2011).
14. Id. at 61.
15. Id. at 108.
16. Id. at 111.
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majority of Airgas’s stock [was] held by merger arbitrageurs17 who
might be willing to tender into such an inadequate offer.”18 Relying on
the long-standing principle that a board may reasonably rely on
independent financial advisors, the court first determined that the Airgas
board had a good faith, reasonable belief that the final offer was
inadequate.19 In light of “sufficient evidence that a majority of
stockholders might be willing to tender their shares regardless of
whether the price is adequate or not,”20 the court determined that the
alleged threat was legitimate and that the first prong of the Unocal test
was satisfied.21 The court found that the second prong of the Unocal test
was satisfied as well. The board’s actions were not “draconian” because
Air Products could run another proxy contest to replace the Airgas
board.22 The board’s response was within a range of reasonableness
because it “[did] not forever preclude Air Products” from running a
proxy contest23 and permitted the company to continue being run
successfully according to the status quo.24
In evaluating the board’s perceived threat that shareholders may
tender into an inadequate offer, the Airgas court (somewhat
inconsistently) used the term “merger arbitrageur” to classify investors
perceived to have short-term economic incentives.25 At the time
litigation commenced, this type of shareholder constituted half of the
company’s shareholder base.26 The court’s classification yields two key
characteristics of short-term-driven investors. First, these investors’
economic incentives27 are driven by their use of merger arbitrage and
event-driven investment strategies.28 Second, Hedge Funds represent a
substantial portion of the investors utilizing these strategies.29

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
Id. at 105.
See id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 120–22.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 124–25.
See id. at 109–112.
Id. at 109 (“[A] large percentage (almost half) of Airgas’s stockholders are
merger arbitrageurs.”).
27. See id. at 118 (noting Airgas’s expert witness’ chart identifying 46% of
outstanding shares as held by “arbitrageurs and event-driven investors”).
28. See generally infra Part II.C. (explaining these strategies).
29. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 109 n. 413.
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The Airgas court went on to explain the rationale for classifying
shareholders based on their economic incentives. Since many of these
shareholders purchased Airgas stock “at [the bid’s commencement or, at
least at] a time when the stock was trading much lower than it is today . .
. they stand to make a significant return on their investment even if the
[tender] offer grossly undervalues Airgas.”30 Relying on the evidence in
the record, particularly each party’s expert witnesses on shareholder
voting, the court noted that there was adequate evidence to find that “a
large number—if not all—of the arbitrageurs . . . would be happy to
tender their shares, [if profitable], regardless of the potential long-term
value of the company.”31 Thus, the court concluded, “the risk” of a
large number of short-term-driven shareholders tendering into an
inadequate offer at the expense of long-term shareholders’ interests
constitutes a legitimate threat for Unocal purposes.32
C. THE CONTROVERSY
Writing the opinion, Chancellor William B. Chandler expressed
frustration with the result but considered the court to be constrained by
Delaware precedent.33
Reviewing the development of Unocal
jurisprudence, Chandler traced the idea that shareholders might tender
into an inadequate offer back to concerns that shareholders were not
sufficiently informed by the company’s board.34 But, he continued,
“[o]nce the stockholders have access to [adequate] information, the
potential for stockholder ‘confusion’ seems substantially lessened.”35
30.
31.
32.

Airgas, 16 A.3d at 109.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 111–12 (“This is a clear ‘risk’ under the teachings of TW Services and
Paramount because it would essentially thrust Airgas into Revlon mode.”)
33. See generally id. at 57–58 (briefly describing reservations about the decision).
34. See generally id. at 93–94 (reviewing the development of Unocal
jurisprudence).
35. Id. at 100; id. at 57 (“Airgas’s stockholder base is sophisticated and wellinformed, and . . . essentially all the information they would need to make an informed
decision is available to them. In short, there seems to be no threat here—the
stockholders know what they need to know (about both the offer and the Airgas board’s
opinion of the offer) to make an informed decision.”); id. at 100 (“If the stockholders
are presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed
competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for
deliberation has been afforded them?”) (quoting Chesapeake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293,
328 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
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Chandler continued on to note that Airgas’ shareholders were
sophisticated, well-informed, and had access to “essentially all the
information” they would need to make an informed decision.36 Thus, in
his view, but for Unocal and its progeny, Airgas’ stockholders would be
permitted to vote.37 Indeed, “directors of a corporation still owe
fiduciary duties to all stockholders—this undoubtedly includes shortterm as well as long-term holders.”38
Binding Delaware precedent, however, focuses judicial scrutiny of
a company board’s actions on whether a company is affirmatively
selling itself—meaning Revlon applies39—or maintaining the status
quo—meaning Unocal applies—instead of considering whether
shareholders are adequately informed.40 Here, merger negotiations had
reached an apparent “end stage” and the Airgas board continued to resist
Air Products’ merger overtures.41 Ultimately, Delaware precedent
provides that “a board cannot be forced into Revlon mode any time a
hostile bidder makes a tender offer that is at a premium.”42 Thus,
Chandler reluctantly concluded that Unocal was satisfied in this case
and the pill could be maintained.43
II. WHAT ARE THE PREFERENCES AND INCENTIVES OF HEDGE FUNDS?
Part II will provide a basis to explain Hedge Funds’ incentives and
preferences. Section A will provide a background of Hedge Funds.
Section B will develop the common investment strategies used by
Hedge Funds. Section C will identify merger arbitrage and event-driven
activism as the two strategies most applicable to takeovers and describe
how they work. This section will also identify common conflicts of
interest posed by Hedge Funds, particularly in relation to derivative use.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 129.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986), the Delaware Supreme Court held that, when a Delaware corporation puts itself
up for sale, its directors have an affirmative duty to seek the best price for its
shareholders.
40. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 103 (“Thus, it seemed . . . that so long as a corporation is
not for sale, it is not in Revlon mode and is free to pursue its long run goals. In essence,
. . . a well-informed board acting in good faith in response to a reasonably perceived
threat may, in fact, be able to ‘just say no’ to a hostile tender offer.”).
41. Id. at 100–01.
42. Id. at 129.
43. Id.

130

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

A. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND?
Hedge Funds “are actively managed investments that pool
investors’ capital in order to acquire, own, and trade one or more of
securities, commodities, and financial products.”44 According to Hedge
Fund Research Inc., global assets under management reached $2.19
trillion as of the end of the third quarter of 2012.45 In comparison to
other investment vehicles, Hedge Funds face few regulatory
restrictions.46 Investments are premised on managers’ skill in generating
a risk-adjusted return, or “alpha.”47 Managers are typically compensated
in two forms: management fees equal to 1 to 2% of assets under
management48 and performance fees equaling 20% of investment returns
that exceed a certain “hurdle” rate.49 When losses deplete investors’
initial capital contributions, managers are generally precluded from
receiving performance-based compensation until that capital is restored
and the specified rate has been exceeded.50 Investors are usually not
contractually permitted to sell or redeem their shares for a specified
amount of time called a “lock-up” period51 without incurring redemption
fees.52

44. Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 323, 324 (2007).
45. Hedge Fund Assets Surge to Record in Third Quarter, HEDGE FUND RESEARCH,
INC., 1 (2012), https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20121018.pdf.
46. See generally Lydie N.C. Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public
Good, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 46–55 (2009) (discussing the limited scope
of hedge fund regulation).
47. See id., at 43.
48. This is calculated based on the Net Asset Value and equals the Fund’s Assets
less Liabilities, or Equity. See STUART A. MCCRARY, HOW TO CREATE & MANAGE A
HEDGE FUND 14 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) (2008).
49. Id. at 14–15. For example, a typical Hedge Fund subscription agreement for $1
million might entitle a Hedge Fund manager to 1.5% of the assets under management
and 20% of any returns in excess of the 6% hurdle rate.
50. Id. at 15.
51. “Lock-up periods can range from six months to five years. Lock-up period
restrictions apply to investors’ ability to transfer or sell their interest in a hedge fund.”
Pierre-Louis, supra note 46, at 44.
52. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 14.

2012]

FULL OF HOT AIR?

131

B. COMMON HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES
“Hedge funds generally employ an absolute return approach to
investing through which they seek to profit in a variety of market
environments.”53 In order to preserve strategic flexibility, many—but
not all—Hedge Funds use multiple strategies.54 Since Hedge Funds
“invest across diverse asset classes and types of securities,” their
investment portfolios feature a broad range of investment horizons and
risk characteristics.55 This section is not meant to provide a complete
picture of how Hedge Funds make investment decisions—nor could it
possibly do so. Instead, the discussion sheds light on strategic features
affecting their decision-making.56
Long and short equity is the most common strategy employed by
Hedge Funds and involves taking long and short positions in various
53. STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 33 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
hedgefunds0903.pdf.
54. This feature serves two purposes. First, by diversifying the securities held by
the fund, systemic risk is mitigated. See William Fung & David A. Hsieh, The Risk in
Hedge Fund Strategies: Theory and Evidence from Trend Followers, 14 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 313, 314 (2001). Second, funds allocated to a particular strategy can be reallocated to a different strategy—in which the fund specializes—in response to market
opportunities. See, e.g., Gregory Connor & Teo Lasarte, An Overview of Hedge Fund
Strategies 2, http://www.atrader.com/files/upl/pdf/nid/An-Overview-of-Hedge-FundStrategies.pdf.
55. STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 49, at 33.
56. “Hedge Fund Research (HFR), one of the main hedge fund databases, lists 30
separate strategies (with some overlap between them). Another widely used database,
TASS Research, separates hedge funds into 17 strategy types.” Connor & Lasarte,
supra note 54, at 3. Two other hedge fund databases—Van Hedge and CISDM—
provide coverage of all hedge funds with Van Hedge offering “generic performance
information on hedge fund styles.” Hany A. Shawky & Achla Marathe, Stylistic
Differences Across Hedge Funds as Revealed by Historical Monthly Returns, 2 TECH.
& INV. 26, 27 (2010) [hereinafter Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences].
Traditional risk management tools have been used to describe Hedge Fund strategies by
asset class, direction, type, liquidity and geographical region. See generally Richard
Bookstaber, Hedge Fund Existential, 59 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 20 (2003) (describing
various organizational approaches). Empirical approaches have also attempted to
classify Hedge Fund strategies based on returns. See generally William Fung & David
A. Hsieh, Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading Strategies: The Case of Hedge
Funds, 10 REV. FIN. STUDIES 275, 275–302 (1997) (identifying five distinct strategies);
Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences, supra (focusing on monthly returns and
identifying four distinct strategies and, within two of those categories, eight substrategies).
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equity securities.57 A security purchaser is long when he or she stands to
benefit from any increases in the security’s value. A security purchaser
is short when he or she stands to benefit from any decreases in the
security’s value.58 Long and short portfolios are sometimes highly
concentrated in specific sectors or even companies.59 Long and short
positions may also offset one another, resulting in net long positions or
net short positions. This strategy can be used alongside the marketneutral techniques described below.60
Since many investment strategies generate concentrated risk
attributes, Hedge Funds employ quantitative-based market-neutral
strategies to mitigate systemic risk.61 These strategies are often based on
certain trading rules such as an opinion that a certain sector is more
valuable than another, and feature little manager discretion.62 Leverage
is also commonly applied to market-neutral investing because the
absolute amount of profit per trade can be small.63
Hedge fund managers also commonly use relative value
strategies.64 These strategies have been described as “picking up nickels
in front of bulldozers.”65 They are designed to take advantage of
perceived mispricing among related financial assets and are often based
on “the long-run tendency of market prices to revert to equilibrium

57. Jerald David August & Lawrence Cohen, Hedge Funds – Structure, Regulation
and Tax Implications, in THE PARTNERSHIP TAX PRACTICE SERIES: PLANNING FOR
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES 2009, at 715, 722 (PLI Course Handbook, May-Jun. 2009).
58. Opening a short position involves borrowing and selling a security with the
intent to purchase it back later for a lower price and return it to the borrower. A shortseller thus bears the risk that the security will increase in value. See id.
59. See, e.g., MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 34 (Funds “can have substantial
exposure to specific sectors and even individual companies.”).
60. “A long/short position is created across different investment sectors or within a
particular sector, based on quantitative models designed to dampen broad equity
swings.” August & Cohen, supra note 57, at 722.
61. See, e.g., id. at 722.
62. See, e.g., MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36.
63. See, e.g., Jongho Kim, Can Risks Be Reduced in the Derivatives Market?
Lessons from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles,
6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 29, 73 (2007).
64. FILIPPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 15 (John Wiley
& Sons, Inc.) (2006) (50% of hedge funds employ relative value strategies, including
merger arbitrage).
65. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 102 (Random House) (2000).
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relationships.”66 The simplest example of a relative value trade involves
identifying a price divergence between two historically related stocks
and being short the historically over-valued stock and long the
historically under-valued stock. Typically, Hedge Funds will use
derivatives to offset their “exposure to the price movements of the
underlying securities, interest rates, and broad market movements.”67
Since the pricing discrepancy is usually small, this strategy is also often
highly leveraged.68 Relative value strategies can include convertible
arbitrage,69 fixed income arbitrage,70 and pricing inefficiencies71 in
bonds, government securities, or a company’s debt and equity.72
Other common Hedge Fund strategies are also widely used.
Macroeconomic strategies make large, leveraged bets on “major
macroeconomic events such as changes in interest rates, currency
movements and stock market performance.”73 The strategy is not
market-neutral and “relies on the ability to make superior forecasts” and
decisive execution.74 Similarly, emerging market strategies incorporate
many of the above-discussed strategies, with a focus on developing
countries.75 Managed future strategies focus on “equity index futures,
fixed income futures, options on individual equities and commodity
66.
67.
68.
69.

Connor & Lasarte, supra note 54, at 8.
Id.
Id.
A convertible arbitrage strategy seeks to profit from an undervaluation in the
market of a bond or preferred stock that is convertible to equity. Investors “typically
take a long position in the convertible bond and short the company’s equity. In doing
so, the investor takes advantage of the undervaluation of the convertible bond while
reducing the exposure to the underlying stock price movement.” See generally id. at 8–
9.
70. “[P]rofits are attained by exploiting pricing inefficiencies between related fixed
income securities, while exposure to interest rate risk is neutralized….” August &
Cohen, supra note 57, at 722.
71. “[I]nvestment decisions are based on quantitative models for statistical
arbitrage . . . .” Id.
72. Connor & Lasarte, supra note 54, at 10–11.
73. Id. at 7; Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences, supra note 56, at 27.
74. Connor & Lasarte, supra note 54, at 7.
75. “This strategy involves equity or fixed income investing in emerging markets
around the world. Because many emerging markets do not allow short-selling, nor
offer viable futures or other derivative products with which to hedge, emerging market
investing often employs a long-only strategy.” Mila Getmansky et al., Shifting Through
the Wreckage: Lessons from Recent Hedge Fund Liquidations, in THE WORLD OF
HEDGE FUNDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND ANALYSIS 7, 41 (H. Gifford Fong, ed., World
Sci. Publ’g Co. Pte. Ltd. 2005).
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futures.”76 Fund of funds strategies assume Hedge Funds are a unique
asset class and invest across managers and strategies in order to mitigate
non-systemic market risk and benefit from diversification.77
C. TAKEOVER STRATEGIES: ACTIVISM AND MERGER ARBITRAGE
Event-driven strategies seek special corporate opportunities and
rely largely on fundamental analysis to make investment decisions.78
Two particular types of event-driven strategies—activism and merger
arbitrage—play a major role in attempted takeovers. Section C.1
describes how activism works and how it affects takeovers. Section C.2
explains how merger arbitrage works and how it affects takeovers.
1. Activism
Activist Hedge Funds typically use fundamental analysis79 to
identify favorable investments.80 Approximately $50 billion—or 5% of
global assets81—is committed to activist strategies. Activist strategies
can further be divided into corporate governance and takeover strategies,
Corporate
the two not necessarily being mutually exclusive.82
76.
77.

Shawky & Marathe, Stylistic Differences, supra note 56, at 33.
Na Dai & Hany A. Shawky, Diversification Strategies and the Performance of
Funds of Hedge Funds, 1 (Working Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719749.
78. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 37.
79. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1383 (2007) (“[These funds] maintain concentrated portfolios and often avoid the
hedged or multi-strategy approaches followed by other funds, with their managers
tending to be former investment bankers or research analysts rather than quantitative
experts. They do the research and know their targets well . . . .”).
80. See generally Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds 9–11 (U. Cambridge Faculty L. Research
Paper No. 38/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1932805 (describing Hedge Fund decision-making).
81. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1046 n.135 (2007) (citing 2006 J.P.
Morgan report); Paul R. Kingsley, Hedge Fund Activism and Its Impact on Corporate
Boards, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2007: COUNSELING YOUR CLIENT FOR THE 2007
PROXY SEASON at 15, 17 (PLI Course Handbook, Jan. 17, 2007) (identifying “at least”
$50b devoted to activist strategies as of 2007).
82. See generally Charles M. Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of
Institutional Investors and Institutional Voting, (Working Paper, 2010), available at
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governance activism generally focuses on “advisory vote[s] on
executive pay (‘say-on-pay’ proposals), majority voting in director
elections, the right to call special meetings and independent board
chairmanship . . . proposals for board declassification and poison pill
redemption.”83 Takeover activism generally focuses on cash returns
through “leverage, big dividends, recapitalizations, sales, and similar
transactions that return capital immediately to shareholders.”84
Overall, activism typically involves acquiring relatively small
stakes85 in under-valued companies86 and “propos[ing] strategic,
operational, and financial remedies.”87 Activist targets are often
relatively small.88
Hedge Funds leverage their relatively small
ownership stakes in several ways. Funds may “target . . . several
companies on similar issues,”89 form alliances with influential
shareholders—like Institutional Investors,90—or cooperate with
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1583507 (describing Hedge Fund
Activism within a Corporate Governance-Takeover framework).
83. Theodore N. Mirvis, Takeover Law and Practice 2010, in DELAWARE LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 2011: WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW, at 413, 434
(PLI Course Handbook, May 18, 2011).
84. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 n.20 (2010).
85. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1732 (2008) (“The median maximum ownership stake for
the entire sample is about 9.1%. Even at the 95th percentile in the full sample, the stake
is 31.5%-far short of the level for majority control.”).
86. See id. at 1730 (Hedge Funds often seek stakes in companies with two key
features: low ratios of market value to book value (total cash value of company equity
over balance sheet value of company equity based on assets less liabilities) and “sound
operating cash flows and return on assets.”).
87. Id. at 1729; see also Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New
Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, J. CORP. L. 681, 695 (2007) (defining
hedge fund activism as “any actual or overtly threatened proxy contest or any other
concerted and direct attempt to change the fundamental strategic direction of any
solvent United States public corporation other than a mutual fund. . . . For example,
any campaign using such phrases as value ‘“maximization’” or ‘“enhancement’. . . .”).
88. Bratton, supra note 79, at 1388.
89. See Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1733.
90. See id.; Strine, supra note 84, at 8 n.20 (“The ‘governance activists’ often
amplify the power of the hedge funds by pushing corporate governance measures –
such as the elimination of classified boards and other takeover defenses – that make
boards more susceptible to immediate market pressures” (referencing William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 653, 684 (2010) (“The hedge funds have inspired interventions by large,
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management.91 Activists are often successful92 and, despite a reputation
for management hostility, openly oppose management less than thirty
percent of the time.”93
Takeover activism in target stock holdings typically results in
increased shareholder wealth.94 However, gains attributed to this
strategy can depend on merger consummation.95 When mergers are not
consummated, this strategy produces below-average returns.96 As a
result, takeover activists with target stock holdings are incentivized to
favor merger consummation and can affect merger outcomes in several
ways. Hedge Funds with significant target stakes agitate for higher
quality consideration and initiate value-producing litigation.97 Hedge
Funds also launch takeover bids for those companies in which they are
invested—as principal investors or as part of investment syndicates—
and have also attempted to leverage their holdings to put the company
into play.98 Hedge Funds with significant acquirer stakes engage in

mainstream investment advisors; they also have depended on and received the support
of other, more passive institutional investors.”))).
91. See Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1733.
92. See Bratton, supra note 79, at 1405–06 (finding empirical eighty percent
success in hostile takeovers); Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1732 (estimating two-thirds
empirical success rate in hostile takeovers).
93. Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1732.
94. See Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge Funds as Shareholder
Activists from 1994-2005, 1, 1–4, 20 (July 31, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=992739 (presenting results indicating that aggressive activism,
focusing on obtaining a significant share of the target’s stock, obtaining board control,
and obtaining a variety of securities from the target, among other factors, “significantly
improves short-term and long-term performance of target firms compared to nontargets” but that “passive activism” does not produce abnormal returns); Brav et al.,
supra note 85, at 1731 (finding abnormal returns for activism resulting in changes in
business strategy takeovers, but not for governance-related activism); Robin
Greenwood & Michael Schor, When (Not) to Listen to Activist Investors, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan. 2008, http://hbr.org/2008/01/when-not-to-listen-to-activist-investors/ar/1
(finding strong returns when a takeover occurs, but not otherwise); Jiekun Huang,
Hedge Funds and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Leveraged Buyouts 24-25 (May 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086687 (finding large Hedge Funds holdings is
associated with higher leveraged buyout premia).
95. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 94.
96. See id.
97. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1034–39 (describing Hedge
Fund strategies in mergers).
98. See, e.g., id. at 1040–42.
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activism as well. However, where takeover activists with large target
stock holdings prefer mergers to be consummated, takeover activists
with large acquirer holdings have the opposite incentives and thus often
oppose mergers99 to avoid merger-related stock declines.100
While mainstream shareholders sometimes benefit from takeover
activist strategies, their economic interests can sometimes conflict.101
When Hedge Funds with significant short target positions oppose
mergers through media campaigns102 or litigation,103 their managers’
motivations are limited to their economic incentives. Hedge Funds may
prefer a merger alternative featuring greater consideration while
management prefers a synergy-creating union.104 Hedge Fund managers
might also favor merger outcomes that optimize105 their holdings in
merger party securities, like common shares, preferred shares, debt and
options.106
The use of derivatives can also leverage a Hedge Fund’s merger
influence and exacerbate shareholder conflicts.107 In at least two
99. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1034–39 (discussing Hedge
Funds’ incentives in mergers).
100. See infra note 136. See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 623–28 (1989) (discussing irrational overpayment by
bidders in takeovers).
101. See generally infra Part IV (discussing whether the economic incentives of
Hedge Funds and Institutions are aligned in the takeover context).
102. In the case of In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 670 (Del.
Ch. 2004), a Hedge Fund attempted to prevent consummation of a merger when it stood
to profit from its short position in a specific type of convertible debt security if the
merger failed. In order to protect its interest, the hedge fund published a newspaper
advertisement urging rejection of the transaction, convinced a proxy advisory firm not
to recommend the merger and started a website encouraging target shareholders to seek
appraisal rights. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1073.
103. In the case of High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487
(M.D. Pa. 2005), a Hedge Fund initiated litigation designed to prevent merger
consummation when it stood to profit from its short position if the merger failed.
104. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 582–83 (2006).
105. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1289 (2008).
106. See Hu & Black, infra note 107, at 835 (describing decoupling strategy of
hedge funds, like using borrowed shares to profit from put options); see also Peter
Lattman, Fortress Clashes on Both Sides, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at C1 (discussing
conflicts of interest when private equity firms, like Fortress, have both debt and equity
in the same firm).
107. See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
775, 789–94 (2005) (describing seven situations where shareholders use derivatives to
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instances, Hedge Funds entered into complex derivative transactions to
enhance their voting power without incurring additional economic risk.
In High River Ltd. Partnership v. Mylan Labs,108 a Hedge Fund with a
large target position arranged for two banks to borrow ten percent of the
acquirer’s shares and sell short to the hedge fund the shares to vote in
the merger.109 The Fund and the banks also entered into a total return
swap on the same number of Mylan shares.110 The swap required the
fund to pay the banks any increases in share value, thereby offsetting the
banks’ short position in the acquirer, and for the banks to pay any
decreases in share value to the fund, thereby offsetting the Hedge Fund’s
long position in the acquirer.111 Thus, the Hedge Fund held no
economic interest in the acquirer by virtue of the swap and, if the merger
were consummated, the Hedge Fund would gain on its substantial preswap target holding when the target increased to the merger price.112
Similarly, in CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Investment Fund (UK)
LLP,113 a Hedge Fund began building a significant position in CSX by
entering into cash-settled total return swaps with several different
banks.114 The Hedge Fund sought to increase its interest in CSX to gain
vary their short-term and long-term economic interests while retaining voting power);
see generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S.CAL L. REV. 811 (2006) (discussing the
negative consequences resulting from shareholders acquiring voting rights with limited
economic risk).
108. 353 F. Supp. 2d 487 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
109.
Charles M. Nathan, Merger Arbitrage, Beneficial Ownership Reporting and
Proxy Contests: The SEC’s Perry Order, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 4 (Oct. 25, 2009),
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2854_1.pdf.
110. See id. A swap agreement in which one party makes payments based on a set
rate, either fixed or variable, while the other party makes payments based on the return
of an underlying asset. See Financial Derivative Terms, FINCAD,
http://www.fincad.com/derivatives-resources/glossary/total-return-swap.aspx
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2012).
111. See Nathan, supra note 109, at 4.
112. The merger was not consummated for unrelated reasons. See Nathan, supra
note 109, at 5. The SEC indicated that the Hedge Fund should have disclosed its
ownership position, but found no other securities laws violations. See id at 5–6, 9.
113. 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d
Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011).
114. Total Return Swaps can either be cash-settled or settled-in-kind. A cash-settled
swap is terminated when the Hedge Fund receives the cash equivalent of any
appreciation and cash distributions (interest or dividends) generated by the underlying
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board seats through a proxy contest,115 and ultimately direct CSX’s
business strategy in accordance with its own economic interests. In fact,
the fund at one point even contemplated the possibility of an LBO.116
The Hedge Fund accumulated approximately fourteen percent of the
voting power in CSX through a combination of derivative and physical
holdings.117 Initially, the Hedge Fund did not cause its physical
holdings, nor the physical holdings of any of its counterparties to exceed
five percent of CSX, which would have triggered mandatory disclosure
under the Williams Act.118 Eventually however, the Hedge Fund
consolidated its derivative holdings into two counterparties, in part
because they believed these banks would be more willing to vote the
shares according to the Hedge Fund’s wishes.119 The Hedge Fund did
not disclose its physical and derivative holdings to the SEC until
officially coordinating with another Hedge Fund to act as a group for
securities law purposes.120 At that time, the Hedge Fund disclosed both
its physical and derivative holdings. A suit was brought by CSX against
the Hedge Fund alleging, inter alia, that the disclosure of beneficial
ownership was not timely filed.121 The District Court, relying on factspecific analysis and without expressly deciding whether total return
swaps necessarily constitute beneficial ownership for Williams Act
purposes, held that the Hedge Fund did not file its disclosure in a timely
fashion because the total return swaps in this instance constituted a
violation of the anti-evasion provisions of the Williams Act.122

security. See id. at 520. A settled-in-kind swap is terminated identically, except the
Hedge Fund purchases the security in exchange for its price at a pre-determined, presale reference date (i.e., the fifteenth day of the preceding month). Id.
115. See id. at 526.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 528–29.
119. Id. at 529–30.
120. Id. at 535–36.
121. Id. at 538.
122. Id. at 545–48.
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2. Merger Arbitrage
What is Merger Arbitrage?
Merger arbitrage funds “seek to profit from trades involving change
of corporate governance.”123 In a typical merger, the putative acquirer
makes a tender offer or merger proposal to purchase the target
company’s shares for a significant premium. Once the merger is
announced, shares of the target usually increase and shares of the
acquirer usually decrease.124 Target stock will generally continue to
trade at a discount to merger consideration125 because of the risk that the
merger will not be completed.126 This is the arbitrage opportunity.127
Merger Arbitrageurs
Once the merger is announced, traders and Hedge Funds known as
“merger arbitrageurs” begin acquiring stakes in the merger parties,128
and trading steadily increases until the merger is either consummated or
fails.129 Arbitrageurs make money in two ways: pre-merger sales of
appreciated merger party securities and post-merger sales of merger
consideration.130 Even though arbitrageurs invest a relatively small
123.
124.

MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36.
See Stanley Block, Merger Arbitrage Hedge Funds, 16 J. APPLIED FIN. 88, 89
(2006) (citing 5-15% premia post-merger announcement for cash mergers).
125. Mark Mitchell et al., Price Pressure around Mergers, 59 J. FIN. 31, 35 (2004).
126. Empirical studies have identified certain material risks associated with merger
arbitrage: “target’s stock price run-up, termination fees, ownership in target’s shares by
bidding firm, target resistance, arbitrage spread, relative target size, transaction size,
bidding competition, deal consideration structure, and bid premium.” Jia Wang & Ben
Branch, Takeover Success Prediction and Performance of Risk Arbitrage, 15 J. BUS. &
ECON. STUDIES 1, 1 (2009). Other factors affecting non-consummation include
rejection by shareholders, antitrust concerns, and the deteriorating financial condition of
either merger party or the economy. Block, supra note 124, at 89.
127. See Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk
Arbitrage, 56 J. FIN. 2135, 2138 (2001) (finding 4% risk arbitrage returns for mergers
between 1963 and 1998 after adjusting for transaction costs).
128. Keith M. Moore et al., The Behavior of Risk Arbitrageurs in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 9 J. ALT. INV. 19, 26 (2006).
129. Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers, 15 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 837, 837 (2002).
130. See MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36, 37 (“The success of a particular [merger
arbitrage] trade hinges almost entirely on whether the announced deal is completed.”);
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amount of their portfolios in any single transaction,131 as a group they
often number between thirty and forty percent of all stockholders during
the period after the merger is announced.132
Arbitrageurs are relatively risk-averse133 and generally support
mergers.134 While it is possible to profit by betting against a merger
succeeding,135 the unexpected failure of a few transactions can
completely eliminate annual profits of merger arbitrageurs betting in
favor of merger consummation.136 Mergers are consummated nearly
ninety percent of the time137 and arbitrageurs determine whether or not
see also Cornelli & Li, supra note 129, at 838; Jim Hsieh & Ralph A. Walkling,
Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions 6 (Tuck
Contemporary Corp. Fin. Issues III Conference Paper; Dice Ctr. Working Paper No.
2003-14, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=571022 (“Unlike small shareholders or noise traders, arbitrageurs tend to accumulate
blocks of target shares after an acquisition announcement and sell their shares to the
bidder at resolution of the offer.”); Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 35 (“[I]f the
merger fails, the target firm’s stock price usually falls dramatically, generating a large
negative return. Merger arbitrageurs are compensated for bearing this transaction
risk.”).
131. See Moore et al., supra note 128, at 26 (noting that arbitrageurs generally limit
the size of their trades to approximately ten percent of a mean $150 million portfolio).
132. Cornelli & Li, supra note 129, at 838; Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 34
(citing forty per-cent acquirer short interest in fixed stock consideration mergers).
133. See Defendants’ Post-Supplemental Hearing Memorandum at 16, Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (2010) (5249-CC, 5256-CC), 2011 WL 396487,
at *16 (Arbitrageurs “are more likely to be risk averse than risk loving (although risk
tolerance will also vary depending upon the size of the firm, investment strategies,
etc.)” (citing ISS report)).
134. See, e.g., id. (Arbitrageurs’ “willingness to ‘leave some money on the table in
exchange for an earlier and more certain pay out’ . . . ‘can make [them] a hostile
acquirer’s best ally.’”) (citing ISS report).
135. See Dion Friedland, About Hedge Funds – Reducing Market Risk with Merger
Arbitrage, MAGNUM FUNDS, available at http://www.magnum.com/hedgefunds/
reducingmarketrisk.asp (“Others, anticipating failed deals, short the target’s stock. For
example, Paulson Partners shorted the stock of AEL Industries Inc., a supplier of
electronic systems and subsystems, after acquisition plans by another company were
reported to be on shaky ground.”); see also infra note 143 (providing merger arbitrage
calculation).
136. Ben Branch & Taewon Yang, A Test of Risk Arbitrage Profitability, 15 INT’L
REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 39 (2006) (finding that the failure of six of one hundred merger
attempts in 2002 resulted in a 5.7 percent loss).
137. Block, supra note 124, at 89 (“[T]he median probability of successful
consummation of all mergers is 89%. However, the success rate is slightly higher for
flexible stock for stock exchanges (93%), and slightly lower for cash and fixed stock for
stock exchanges (87 and 88%, respectively).”).
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to support a merger based on its offer characteristics and other factors
affecting consummation.138 Arbitrageurs exhibit skill in identifying
high-likelihood mergers:139 mergers with greater arbitrageur holdings are
more likely to be consummated140 and arbitrageurs avoid offers unlikely
to result in a merger, such as those with especially high takeover
premia.141 Arbitrageurs also exhibit skill in affecting merger outcomes:
increased holdings are associated with greater likelihood of
consummation, increased bid premia, and higher arbitrage returns.142
Merger arbitrage is conducted through various strategies of
differing complexity and the choice of strategy depends, in part, on the
consideration offered in the merger. This section discusses merger
arbitrate strategies associated with mergers involving (i) cash
consideration, (ii) fixed stock consideration, (iii) floating stock
consideration, and (iv) stock consideration with collars.
Merger Option 1: Cash Consideration
Cash mergers present the simplest arbitrage opportunity. The
expected return on a cash transaction is the probability that the merger
will be consummated multiplied by the difference between the merger
consideration and the stock purchase price, plus the probability that the
merger will not be consummated multiplied by the difference between
the stock purchase price and the stock price prior to the merger
announcement.143

138. See id. (“[A] friendly negotiated offer is 20.48 times more likely to succeed
than a hostile tender offer.”). See generally supra note 126 (describing merger
consummation risks).
139. See Hsieh & Walkling, supra note 130, at 5–6 (discussing evidence of
arbitrageurs “anticipat[ing] deal success rates”).
140. See id.; Neiliane Williams, Arbitrageur Activity and Market Anticipation in
Predicting Takeover Success 9 (Mar. 2009) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Concordia
University) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations and Theses) (finding evidence that
post-merger announcement stock price run-up correlates with merger success).
141. Ben S. Branch & Jia Wang, Risk-Arbitrage Spreads and Performance of Risk
Arbitrage, 11 J. ALT. INV. 9 (2008).
142. See Hsieh & Walkling, supra note 130, at 36 (discussing evidence that merger
arbitrageurs “exert active influence in the takeover market”).
143. This formula can be expressed in terms of annual returns as:
[C *G – L * (100 – C)]/[Y * P] where C is the probability of merger consummation, G
is the positive return of the merger consideration less the security purchase price, L is
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Merger Option 2: Fixed Stock Consideration
When merger consideration is in a fixed ratio of stock instead of
cash, analyzing the expected transaction value and determining an
appropriate arbitrage strategy is more complicated.144 Say Company A
offers Company T 0.5 shares of Company A stock worth $80 for every
share of Company T stock worth $35 on the day of announcement.145
Company T shareholders should be concerned that Company A stock
will decline and decrease the aggregate transaction value. In order to
lock in merger consummation gains, a Company T stockholder will
short146 0.5 shares of Company A stock for every Company T stock
share that is held.147 “A similar merger arbitrage position as described
above can also be constructed with options. Instead of short selling
[Company A] shares, an investor can sell call options and buy put
options with the same maturity date and exercise price.”148 In order to
hedge against the possibility that the merger will not be consummated
and that the investor has an unprotected short position in Company A,

the negative return of the security purchase price less the pre-merger-announcement
security price, Y is the holding period and P is the security purchase price.
144. Empirical accounts of arbitrageur trading patterns match predictions about how
this basic trade operates. Thus, in a fixed stock consideration merger, median short
interest in acquiring firms is forty percent. See Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 34
(confirming the prediction that arbitrageurs will purchase sizeable short stakes in the
acquirer to hedge against merger non-consummation).
145. See id. at 33 (commenting that most stock mergers involve fixed consideration
ratios and describing the mechanics of the trade).
146. “Preparation for a short sale begins with a request that the arbitrageur’s broker
find a lender for the shares that are to be sold. The universe for potential lenders
include the broker itself if it has an inventory of the desired stock, or institutional
investors, including pension funds, insurance companies, and index funds . . . . The
arbitrageur transfers collateral to the lender in the amount of 102% of the value of the
borrowed securities, typically in cash. The lender then pays interest to the arbitrageur
on the cash collateral, termed the rebate rate, and has the right to call the loan at any
time.” Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 728 (2003).
147. Consider that Company T shareholders expect a $5 return on each $35 share
that is being exchanged for one-half Company T share. Selling short the one-half
Company A share for $40 provides the shareholder with $40 cash and the obligation to
turn over one-half Company A share on the date of merger. If Company A’s half-share
declines to $35, the Company T shareholder still has a $5 return.
148. Arco Wagemakers, BofA/Countrywide Merger Arbitrage Opportunity, SEEKING
ALPHA,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/66797-bofa-countrywide-merger-arbitrageopportunity.
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the Company T stockholder should buy a call option149 or sell a put
option150 on Company A stock.151
Merger Option 3: Floating Stock Consideration
A variation of the fixed ratio stock merger is the floating ratio stock
merger. Here, Company A proposes an all-stock merger with Company
T for a fixed value of Company A shares. The value in Company A
shares is determined by Company A’s average price during a designated
pricing period.152 For the arbitrageur, the transaction is the same as a
cash merger before the pricing period–because the consideration is
fixed—and the same as a fixed ratio merger post-pricing period—
because the consideration is now variable.153 Thus, the arbitrageur will
adopt the above-described strategies for each period: purchasing target
stock pre-pricing period and acquiring short positions post-pricing
period.154 Arbitrageurs have particular difficulty pricing this trade due
to information constraints and value fluctuations.155

149. A call option is the right to purchase a security for a fixed price (the strike
price) on a fixed date plus the price of exercising the option. For example, the right to
purchase one share of Company A stock for $75 on the date of merger with a $1
exercise price is a call option.
150. A put option is the right to sell a security for a fixed price (the strike price) on a
fixed date plus the price of exercising the option. For example, the right to sell one
share of Company A stock for $75 on the date of merger and a $1 exercise price is a put
option.
151. Buying a call option on the Company A stock enables the Company T to cover
its short position for the option exercise price plus the strike price (and the initial option
price). Exercising the option will be less expensive than purchasing the security in the
market when the market price exceeds the strike price plus the option exercise price.
Selling a put option on the Company A stock allows the Company T stockholder to
receive the initial option price. The option holder will only exercise the option if the
security’s market price is less than the strike price plus the exercise price.
152. Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 36.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 33 (describing arbitrageur difficulties pricing floating stock merger trades
with limited information); see also Block, supra note 124, at 91 (discussing 2001
merger of two insurance companies featuring floating stock consideration and collars).

2012]

FULL OF HOT AIR?

145

Merger Option 4: Stock Consideration with Collars
Variations of stock consideration mergers may further increase the
complexity of the arbitrage trade.156 Some mergers involve “collars,”
which define the applicable range of consideration to be used in the
merger.157 A fixed stock consideration “collar” sets the minimum and
maximum value of acquirer shares to be used in the transaction.158 For
example, Company A proposes a merger with Company T where 1 share
of Company A stock, currently worth $10, will be exchanged for 2
shares of Company T stock, currently worth $4.50 each. A “collar”
provision is negotiated guaranteeing that, regardless of price changes,
the consideration, in Company A shares, for each Company T share will
be no less than $9 and no more than $11. A “collar” provision could
instead be negotiated guaranteeing that, regardless of price changes, the
consideration, in Company A shares, for each Company T share, will be
no less than 0.9 shares and no more than 1.1 shares.159
III. WHAT ARE THE PREFERENCES AND INCENTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS?
Part III will provide a basis to explain Institutional Investors’
incentives and preferences. Section A provides a background of the
Institutional Investors landscape. Section B develops their economic
interests by analyzing their investment characteristics and investing
approaches. Section C discusses Institutional Investor responses to
anticipated takeovers.
A. WHAT IS AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR?
Mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and foundations
make up the universe of Institutional Investors.160 It should be noted

156. See generally Mitchell et al., supra note 125, at 37–38 (describing stock merger
consideration variations).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 37.
159. Id.
160. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen Davis, Are Institutional Investors Part of the
Problem or Part of the Solution?, in NINTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 55, 61 (PLI Course Handbook, Sept. 7, 2011) (“At the
end of 2009, there were more than 700,000 pension funds, 8,600 mutual funds, 7,900
insurance companies in the US alone.”).
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that retail investors161 will not be discussed in this Note because they
have little effect on corporate events162 and are, in large part, the
beneficiaries of mutual funds and pension funds.163 Mutual funds alone
constitute the “largest shareholder category in U.S. public markets,”164
and the industry is dominated by a small number of large funds.165
There are three major types of pension funds: public pension funds
organized for the benefit of state and local government employees,
which are often advised by political officials; labor-union pension funds
organized for the benefit of union members;166 and private pension funds
organized for the benefit of private-sector employees. In the aggregate,
Institutions own more than half of the shares in the stock market.167
Institutional fund manager compensation bears some similarities to
Hedge Fund manager compensation. Both forms of compensation
typically include management fees and performance incentives,168 but
Institutional managers’ performance-based compensation is limited by
direct regulation and indirect pressure. Mutual fund managers are
161. Retail Investors are “individuals with small stakes in a particular firm.” See Lee
Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections, 2010
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 104 (2010).
162. Id. at 104 (“[T]he evidence suggests that contested corporate elections are
virtually off-limits as a conduit for [retail investor] activism. Retail investors almost
never launch a campaign and their interests are not represented well by those who do.”).
163. Id. at 131 fn.83 (describing retail investors as pension fund and mutual fund
beneficiaries).
164. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 12
(52nd ed. 2012).
165. The largest twenty five firms managed seventy three percent of mutual fund
assets in 2011, and the largest ten firms managed fifty three percent. Id. at 25.
166. A more detailed overview of public and labor-union pension funds appears in
Anabtawi, supra note 108, at 588–89.
167. Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights around
Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 J.
CORP. FIN. 129, 129 (2009). See generally JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS,
THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE
CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 3 (U. Penn. Press) (2000) (characterizing
Institutional Investors as “universal owners” with exposure to the entire economy).
168. See Gilchrist Sparks, III & John P. DiTomo, The Short-Term Vs. Long-Term
Dilemma, in NINTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 125,
130 (PLI Course Handbook, Sept. 7, 2011) (Performance-based compensation for
pension fund, mutual fund and endowment fund investment managers “often include[s]
hurdle rates and exponential performance incentives.”); accord supra notes 49–50 and
accompanying text (describing Hedge Fund compensation arrangements).
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directly regulated: they are permitted to receive management fees169 and
limited performance-based compensation,170 but are barred from
receiving capital-gain-based compensation.171 Public pension fund
managers are indirectly regulated: political pressure may limit
government officials from authorizing generous compensation
packages.172
B. COMMON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STRATEGIES
Institutions employ a broad range of investment strategies.173 A
minority of Institutional Investors even invests in Hedge Funds.174
Notwithstanding those allocations, Institutions generally favor
diversified portfolios of liquid assets and typically avoid sophisticated
investment techniques.
169.
170.

MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 12.
Id. (“Although mutual funds can collect performance-based incentive fees,
most do not, and the incentive fees are almost always smaller than the smallest hedge
fund incentive fees.”).
171. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-b-5(a)(1) (2006) (“No
investment adviser . . . [shall be compensated] on the basis of a share of capital gains
upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of the client.”).
Registered Investment Companies–which include most mutual funds–are required to
hire Registered Investment Advisors. 15 U.S.C. § 80-b-3(b)(3).
172. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1057–59.
173. See Arik Ben Dor et al., Understanding Mutual Fund And Hedge Fund Styles
Using Return-Based Style Analysis, in THE WORLD OF HEDGE FUNDS:
CHARACTERISTICS AND ANALYSIS 63, 64 (H. Gifford Fong ed., World Sci. Publ’g Co.
Pte. Ltd. 2005) (“For example, Morningstar, a prominent source of information on
mutual funds, reports returns on four broad categories (domestic stock funds,
international stock funds, fixed-income funds, and municipal bond funds) which are
further divided into 48 sub-categories. The Investment Company Institute enumerates
33 investment objective categories.”).
174. “80% of public pension funds, and 82% of corporate funds, have little or no
investment in hedge funds.” See Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (July 25, 2006)
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm.
The remaining public
pension funds allocate an average of 5.1%. Id. About two-thirds of foundations invest
in Hedge Funds, with an average allocation of 18%. See Barbara T. Dreyfuss, What
Hedge Funds Risk, AM. PROSPECT, (June 17, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/whathedge-funds-risk; Hedge Fund Sources of Capital, THE HENNESSEE GROUP,
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/information/info/SourcesofCapital 2005.pdf (Hedge
Fund capital, as of 2005, is composed 14% from corporations, 7% from pension funds,
and 7% from charitable foundations and endowments.).
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1. Investment Characteristics
Most Institutions are required by state or federal law to invest in
highly liquid assets and maintain well-diversified portfolios.175 Mutual
funds advertised as “diversified” face significant regulatory
requirements.176 State-regulated public pension funds and insurance
companies are often required to keep a stated percentage of their
investment portfolios in liquid, publicly-traded securities.177 Federally
regulated private pension funds also “continue to place the bulk of their
investments in public securities markets.”178 By contrast, less-regulated
private foundations typically invest more capital in illiquid securities.179
Institutional liquidity preferences and investment horizons also vary
according to their beneficiaries’ needs. Retail-investor-focused mutual
fund managers prefer liquid, short-term investments180 because they face
daily withdrawals.181 Insurance companies and pension funds have
longer investment horizons because benefits will be paid further in the
future.182 Some mutual funds address liquidity and diversification

175.
176.

See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 105, at 1278–79.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1049 (describing legal rules requiring
many mutual funds to diversify).
177. Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital
Markets, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 247 (2009). But see Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1057–59, 1057 n.179 (2007) (noting that public pension funds,
while subject to a prudent investor standard, are not statutorily required to diversify but
may face political pressures requiring it).
178. Id.
179. Id. (“[T]hose [funds] that are more willing to embrace investment
experimentation (endowment funds) have shown a willingness to increase their
allocation to private securities markets.”).
180. François Derrien et al., Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies 2 (Oct. 20,
2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.efmaefm.org/
0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA ANNUAL MEETINGS/2010-Aarhus/EFMA2010_0159_
fullpaper.pdf; Jose-Miguel Gaspara et al., Shareholder Investment Horizons and the
Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 136 (2005); see also Anabtawi,
supra note 104, at 579 (noting that mutual funds turnover their shares about once a
year, one-third as often as Hedge Funds).
181. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 11.
182. Derrien et al., supra note 180, at 1–2; Gaspara et al., supra note 180, at 136.
But see Heineman & Davis, supra note 160, at 67 (discussing long-term investment
constraints for pension funds, life insurance companies and foundations, but noting
inapplicability of this analysis to mutual funds).
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restrictions by allocating funds to low-cost, passive investment
strategies.183 These so-called index funds are designed to produce the
returns of all the stocks on an index like the S&P 500 while minimizing
transaction costs (i.e. trades) for beneficiaries.184
2. Investment Approaches
Institutional Investors tend to avoid many of the investment
techniques favored by Hedge Funds.185 Indeed, they rarely invest
borrowed funds186 and are often contractually prohibited from shortselling.187 While Institutions typically offset portfolio risks with simple
hedging derivatives,188 many are not permitted to use more sophisticated

183. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 105, at 1276. But see Sparks & DiTomo, supra
note 168, at 130 (“Mutual funds and other asset managers often forego long-term
strategies through churning portfolios to attract new investments for the next quarter.”).
184. See Anabtawi, supra note 104, at 579 n.82.
185. Compare supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text with supra notes 53–56,
60–77 and accompanying text.
186. Mutual funds do not usually use leverage and it “almost never exceeds 2:1.”
MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 11. Insurance companies employ minimal leverage and
most defined-contribution and corporate pension funds do not use leverage at all.
Nikola Spatafora, Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial
Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risks, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 2009:
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, 319, 388 (PLI Course Handbook, Aug. 5, 2009).
187. See, e.g., Andres Almazan et al., Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager?,
73 J. FIN. ECON. 289, 295 (2004) (reporting two-thirds of mutual fund management
contracts restrict short sales); see also Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-12(a)(1)-(3) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company . .
. to purchase any security on margin . . . or to effect a short sale of any security. . . .”).
188. “A mutual fund may invest in derivatives for a variety of reasons, including for
‘hedging’ (i.e., risk reduction) purposes and as a substitute for investment in
‘traditional’ securities.” Alison M. Fuller, Derivatives, in INVESTMENT COMPANY
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE, 181, 183–84 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 21–22,
2011). But see SEC Seeks Public Comment on Use of Derivatives by Mutual Funds and
Other Investment Companies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-175.htm. Mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds are large
derivative buyers. Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout
Bankruptcies, The Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution,
2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 185 (2011). Pension funds engage in swaps to offset
their interest rate and inflation risk. Jonathon Keath Hance, Note, Derivatives at
Bankruptcy: Lifesaving Knowledge for the Small Firm, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 711,
726 (2008).
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derivatives.189 Despite these restrictions, Institutions represent roughly
one quarter of total end-users of credit derivatives.190
3. Strategies
Institutional activism is principally motivated by preserving
shareholder wealth191 and typically focuses on governance reforms.192
While individual Institutions exhibit unique preferences for certain
governance features,193 they rarely mount electoral challenges.194
Institutions also can support Hedge Funds’ governance initiatives,195
189. Pension Funds are typically barred from investing in index derivatives like
futures and options. W. Thomas Connor, The Evolving Nature of Exchange-Traded
Product Regulation, in FUNDAMENTALS OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE-TRADED
FUNDS 2011, 189, 197 (PLI Course Handbook, June 8, 2011). Mutual Funds are
permitted to purchase these derivatives. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 12.
190. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-07-716, CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISKS,
BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION 6 n.8
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf (“The top five endusers of credit derivatives are banks and broker-dealers (44 percent), hedge funds (32
percent), insurers (17 percent), pension funds (4 percent), and mutual funds (3
percent).”)
191. See generally Cheffins & Armour, supra note 80, at 7–8 (describing
Institutional Investor decision-making).
192. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 105, at 1276 (“A number of prominent
Institutional Investors–including both mutual funds like Fidelity and Vanguard and
pension funds like CalPERS–have emerged as activist investors willing to mount public
relations campaigns, initiate ligation, and launch proxy battles to pressure corporate
officers and directors into following their preferred business strategy.”); Strine, supra
note 84, at 8 n.20 (2010) (“Unlike activist investors in the hedge fund sense, corporate
governance activists primarily agitate only about corporate governance.”); Randall S.
Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 310 (2008) (citing Institutional Investor
activism in securities suits, Rule 14a-8 proposals and public pension fund attempts to
influence management).
193. See generally Joseph McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors at 20 (Tilburg L. Sch., Research
Paper No. 010/2010, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1571046 (comparing and contrasting the governance preferences of Hedge
Funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds).
194. Harris, supra note 161, at 129 (noting that the vast majority of electoral
challenges come from “private firms,” notably Hedge Funds).
195. Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1748; Daniel A. Neff, Takeover Law and
Practice: 2008 13, in FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND
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presumably believing their economic interests to be aligned.196 Overall,
there is mixed evidence that institutional activism generates long-term
value.197 However, pension funds exhibit skill in spurring governance
reforms.198
Institutional investment decisions are also affected by extrinsic
economic factors.
Thus, demonstrating support for company
management could require opposing a value-generating initiative
because management opposes it.199 Similarly, advancing common
political causes could involve exerting pressure on company
management.200

RELATED ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 317, 336 (Sept. 2008) (“In 2007,
institutions and hedge funds launched campaigns against approximately 40
transactions.”). The recent reduction in companies with poison pill defenses is
considered a result of Institutional Investor-Hedge Fund cooperation. Id. at 15 (citing
decline of S&P 500 companies with poison pills from 46% in 2005 to 28% in 2008).
196. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1091–92; see also Andrea Zanoni, Hedge
Funds’ Empty Voting in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Fiduciary Duties Perspective, 9
GLOBAL JURIST, Nov. 2009, at 15, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285589
(inferring that investors perceive hedge fund intervention as adding economic value).
197. Compare Thomas, supra note 192, at 310 n.21 (citing surveys showing little
positive effect) with Claire E. Crutchley et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS’
Activism, 7 FIN. SERVS. REV. 1 (1998) (finding that visible and aggressive institutional
activism leads to substantial increases in shareholder wealth); Michael P. Smith,
Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227
(1996) (finding increased shareholder wealth for issuers that responded to targeting by
CalPERS).
198. David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance 24–25
(N.Y.U. Stern Sch. Bus. Working Paper Series, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1523562 (reviewing empirical studies of pension funds’ monitoring ability).
199. Mutual funds and pension fund managers sometimes vote with company
management and against value-generating resolutions due to perceived or actual
pressure from management. See George W. Dent, The Essential Unity of Shareholders
and the Myth of Shareholder Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 119 n.89 (2010)
(citing empirical studies and anecdotal evidence). Banks and insurance companies have
also been identified as ex ante likely to favor management. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1277, 1318 (1991). This effect also appears in mergers with low levels of
shareholder support when investment managers may be voting to maintain business
relationships or based on bullish investment opinions on the merged company, or on a
desire to appear activist. See Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 130.
200. See Anabtawi, supra note 104, at 590 (discussing pressure by CalPERS, a
public pension fund, on a company to accept union demands and end the strike of a
powerful private union).
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Proxy advisory firms also affect an Institution’s decision-making.201
These firms publish corporate initiative voting guidelines from the
hypothetical perspective of a one to two year holding period
stockholder.202 ISS, the leading firm,203 “exercises a great deal of
influence over the vote of many of its clients and . . . these clients often
hold an important part of the available vote.”204 Among Institutional
Investors, mutual funds are particularly deferential to advisory
recommendations.205

201. Institutional Shareholder Services, PROXY Governance, Inc., Glass, Lewis &
Company and Egan-Jones Proxy are the leading proxy advisory firms. See Stephen J.
Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649,
650 (2009).
202. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2011 U.S. PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES SUMMARY (describing voting recommendations as based on a one to two
year holder), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicy
SummaryGuidelines20110127.pdf.
203. “[Institutional Shareholder Services] claims over 1,700 institutional clients
managing $26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top
25 asset managers and 17 of the top 25 public pension funds.” Robert Daines et al.,
Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? 1 (Rock Ctr. for
Corp. Governance Stan. Univ.Working Paper 1, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152093.
204. See Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 357-58 (Del.
Ch. 2010), aff’d 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011); Choi et al., supra note 201, at 657 ([ISS] is
“able to sway up to 30 percent of the vote in any particular proxy contest.”); Paul H.
Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Resetting the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Selectica’s
Unanticipated Consequences 36 (Vand. Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Working Paper No.
10-16, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1631941 (“Voting
recommendations by ISS are viewed as influential, if not determinative, in proxy
contests . . . . Institutional investors overwhelming use the services of ISS and the other
third party voting advisors, and empirical research has shown that ISS’s
recommendations have an impact on the outcome in shareholder voting contests.”).
Legal scholars have criticized this trend. See generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy
Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for Increased Oversight and
Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009); Choi et al., supra note 201, at 649.
205. See James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on
Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (“[M]utual funds voted consistently with ISS
voting recommendations more than all shareholders. Given that we cannot break out
the mutual funds’ actual votes from the total vote captured in the all shareholder vote,
this effect is likely to be even larger than what we are measuring with the currently
available data.”); Ying Duan, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance:
Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior 12, 18 (Mar. 7,
2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College) (explaining that Mutual Funds

2012]

FULL OF HOT AIR?

153

C. TAKEOVER STRATEGIES
Institutions protect portfolio wealth by monitoring company
management before a takeover bid is attempted. Public pension funds
exhibit particularly strong monitoring abilities.206 In contrast, mutual
funds are often ineffective long-term value monitors and generally favor
merger bids.207 Overall, longer pre-bid holding periods by Institutions
tend to enhance shareholder wealth, whether a takeover is consummated
or not.208 Institutions also maximize economic wealth by influencing
takeover outcomes.209 Once a takeover bid is announced, Institutions
typically acquire voting rights in the merger parties’ securities.210
Institutions usually retain these shares post-vote211 and are particularly

are more likely to vote against managers than to sell when ISS recommends
management opposition), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101809.
206. Lily Xiaoli Qiu, Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from
Acquisition Activity 2–3 (Brown Econ. Working Paper Series No. 2004-21, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=521803 (suggesting
increased public pension fund monitoring ability results from larger holdings).
207. Id. at 3–4 (discussing mutual funds’ poor monitoring ability).
208. Target companies with shorter holding periods by Institutions are more likely
to be acquired and typically receive lower premia. Gaspara et al., supra note 180, at 137
–38. The authors believe that shorter holding periods by Institutions diminish company
monitoring and weaken the company’s bargaining position. Id. Consequently, they
argue, target shareholders capture a reduced portion of the economic surplus available
in the merger bid. Id.
209. Jarrad Harford et al., Conflicts of Interests among Shareholders: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions 25 (Mass. Inst. Tech., Sloan Research Paper No. 4653-07,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=947596 (finding evidence that cross-owners
may disagree about whether the transaction should proceed and hypothesizing that
portfolio optimization is the underlying rationale); see also Anabtawi, supra note 104,
at 585 (hypothesizing Institutional Investor opposition to the Oracle/PeopleSoft merger
if the merger negatively affected the Investor’s stakes in other PeopleSoft-using
companies).
210. For example, Institutional Investors may purchase discounted acquirer shares
post-merger-announcement in order to vote for the merger and gain on their target
holdings. They also may use those shares to vote against the merger and avoid a postmerger acquirer share price decline. See generally Bethel et al., supra note 167, at
130; Kai Chen, Institutional Behavior of Trading Acquirer Stocks around Mergers and
Acquisitions, in Essays on Corporate Control Transactions 42, 60 (May 11, 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) (on file with
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses) (describing the behavior of Institutions post-merger
announcement).
211. Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 130.
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active in purchasing voting rights when they are cheaply available.212
Since diversified Institutions generally “cross-own” both target and
acquirer shares,213 they usually determine whether or not to support a
merger based on the aggregate economic effects on portfolio wealth.214
Thus, an Institution hoping to manage a target company’s pension funds
may purchase acquirer shares to vote against a merger.215
IV. HEDGE FUNDS AND INSTITUTIONS LACK SIMILAR ECONOMIC
INTERESTS
Part IV demonstrates that Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors
lack similar preferences and incentives in takeovers. Section A begins
by discussing the claim that Hedge Funds’ takeover activities benefit all
shareholders, including retail investors, Institutional Investors, holders
of beneficial interests in Institutional Investors, or any other holder of
stock, and finds mixed evidence of this assertion. Sections B through D
discuss circumstances in which the interests of Hedge Funds and
Institutional Investors can diverge. Section B describes shareholder risk
tolerances and finds little risk tolerance overlap. Section C describes
these shareholders’ investment horizons and finds limited investment
horizon overlap.
Section D analyzes investment managers’
compensation incentives and finds that these explain much of the
overlap and dissimilarity between the economic incentives of Hedge
Funds and Institutional Investors.
Section E considers intrashareholders conflicts of interest and finds that both Hedge Funds and
Institutions sometimes oppose the interests of other shareholders,
notably retail investors, holders of beneficial interests in Institutional
Investors, and any other holder of stock.

212. Id. at 130–31 (discussing increased purchasing by Institutions in lowprobability mergers).
213. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-ownership, Returns and
Voting in Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 392 (2008).
214. See Chen, supra note 210, at 60; Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 213, at 402–
03 (finding for non-value-generating mergers, cross-owner acquirer shareholders were
much more likely to vote in favor of the merger than acquirer-only shareholders).
215. Bethel et al., supra note 167, at 131.

2012]

FULL OF HOT AIR?

155

A. THE VALUE PROPOSITION
There is mixed evidence that Hedge Funds’ takeover strategies
benefit all shareholders. Merger arbitrage can benefit all shareholders
under limited circumstances. Increased merger arbitrage activity
enhances takeover premia and improves the likelihood of merger
consummation.216 Thus, when a takeover is the only possible outcome,
increased expected takeover premia necessarily benefits all
stockholders. Of course, takeover bids are not always successful.
Moreover, the takeover premia received by the target shareholder in a
merger is not necessarily preferable to potential gains from rejecting a
merger bid and continuing as a stand-alone company. While merger
arbitrage strategies generate value for merger arbitrageurs, it is not clear
that all shareholders benefit.217
In addition, takeover activism only enhances shareholder wealth
when takeovers result.218 Overall, the strategy generates value219 and
enjoys support by Institutions.220 But the strategy is not always valuecreating: unconsummated mergers generate below-average returns.221
Thus, the strategy distorts economic outcomes: successful takeovers are
value-creating and unsuccessful takeovers are value-destroying.
Moreover, while the strategy may on average increase shareholder
returns, such added returns may not adequately compensate shareholders
for the increased risk of takeover failures. Allocating shareholders’
increased expected value and greater return variance is not necessarily
preferable to capturing any gains resulting from rejecting a merger bid
and continuing as a stand-alone company. While takeover activism
generates shareholder value overall, it is not clear that shareholders
aggregately benefit in light of the increased risks.222
B. RISK TOLERANCE
Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors exhibit dissimilar
tolerances for risk in several ways. While Hedge Funds make

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 94–95, 140–42 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 94.
See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
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concentrated investments223 across the universe of asset classes,224 most
Institutions are directly or indirectly required to invest in highly liquid,
diversified portfolios.225 Their respective approaches to leverage, shortselling, and derivatives are instructive as well. While Hedge Funds
liberally employ leverage226 and frequently short sell,227 Institutions
largely avoid borrowing and may face short-selling restrictions.228
Similarly, while Hedge Funds often enter into complex derivative
transactions,229 derivative use by Institutions is typically limited to basic
hedging.230 Hedge Funds also utilize activist strategies four times more
often than Institutions.231 By contrast, Institutional activism is typically
motivated by wealth preservation.232 Overall, Hedge Funds’ and
Institutions’ respective investment characteristics exhibit dissimilar risk
tolerance.
C. INVESTMENT HORIZON
While Hedge Funds and Institutions each exhibit short-term biases,
Hedge Funds’ respective preference is more pronounced. Trading data
indicate that Hedge Funds purchase and sell securities far more often

223. See Harris, supra note 161, at 131 (“The high concentration of these funds
makes them very dissimilar to the investment portfolio of the average shareholder, who
owns a stake in a fully-diversified pension fund or mutual fund.”).
224. See MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 11 (“The range of assets within a particular
mutual fund is much smaller than that of a hedge fund.”).
225. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 63, 68 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 105–22 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
231. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Hedge Fund Investor Activism and
Takeovers 22 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Papers, Paper No. 08-004, 2007), available at
http://hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-004.pdf. Moreover, Institutional Investors do not lead
the majority of challenges. See Harris, supra note 161, at 129 (“If public pension funds,
mutual funds, or similar institutions, were launching the majority of challenges there
might be good reason to believe that the interests of small retail investors were being
served in those contests. Such institutions are likely more responsive to the preferences
of small shareholders, since they likely draw their capital directly from a diverse
investor class.”).
232. See generally Cheffins & Armour, supra note 80, at 7–11 (comparing
Institutional Investor and Hedge Fund decision-making).
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than do average market participants,233 and three times more often than
mutual funds.234 In contrast to a Hedge Fund portfolio’s broad
investment spectrum,235 Institutional allocations exhibit far narrower
liquidity preferences, which reflect their beneficiaries’ needs.236 Yet
while trading data and liquidity preferences demonstrate that Institutions
are less short-term oriented than Hedge Funds, Institutional short-term
biases manifest in other ways. Indeed, Institutions prefer short-term
earnings increases over long-term value.237 Investment manager
compensation incentives also encourage short-term biases for
Institutions and Hedge Funds alike.238
Hedge Funds’ takeover strategies also exhibit signs of short-term
biases compared to Institutions. Merger arbitrage presents a contrast in
shareholder continuity. While merger arbitrageurs liquidate their
holdings as soon as possible,239 Institutions avoid liquidating voting
rights purchased specifically to affect takeover outcomes.240 In addition,
activist holding period data provides limited, conflicting evidence of
Hedge Funds’ relative short-term biases. While some studies find

233. NYSE Group Turnover, NYSE TECHNOLOGIES, www.nyxdata.com/factbook
(choose Market Activity chapter hyperlink; then select NYSE Group Turnover
hyperlink) (detailing one-year average annual turnover for NYSE-listed companies).
234. Anabtawi, supra note 104, at 579 (comparing 117% Mutual Fund turnover rate
to Hedge Fund turnover rate).
235. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text.
237. See Brian Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over
Long-Run Value?, (U. Pa. Working Paper Series, 1999) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=161739 (discussing Institutional
short-term biases). But see Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1085 (“[T]he empirical
evidence on the extent and magnitude of [Institutional] myopia is sketchy at best.”).
238. Heineman & Davis, supra note 160, at 67 (citing the 2011 World Economic
Forum report for support that “‘the goals and objective of the investment decisionmaker might not be aligned with those of the beneficiaries of the investment fund’
owing in part to skewed compensation schemes, risk measures that penalize managers
who favor long-term investments, and career considerations.”).
239. MCCRARY, supra note 48, at 36 (“In some cases, the funds can unwind
positions early if prices of the company shares reflect most of the profit potential.”);
Moore et al., supra note 128, at 26 (noting that arbitrageurs sell their long positions
when transactions are cancelled). Arbitrageurs limit the size of their trades to
approximately ten percent of a mean $150 million portfolio. Id.
240. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
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evidence of comparatively short Hedge Fund holding periods,241 other
studies indicate that activists maintain target stakes242 as long as other
shareholders.243
D. INVESTMENT MANAGER COMPENSATION
The similarities and differences between Hedge Funds’ and
Institutions’ investment horizons and risk tolerances can be explained by
their investment manager compensation incentives and investment
restrictions. Common investment manager incentives likely account for
both types of shareholders exhibiting short-term biases.244 Indeed, since
each investment manager is compensated for achieving performance
benchmarks,245 both should favor short-term increases that achieve those
benchmarks. However, short-term biases of Institutions are dampened
by restrictions on investment manager compensation246 and liquidity,
and by diversification requirements that limit managers’ investment
allocations.247 Those requirements also instill in fund managers of
Institutions with a relatively lower risk tolerance.248 In contrast, Hedge
Fund managers’ risk preferences are incentivized by a compensation
structure rewarding the highest investment returns,249 complemented by
a flexible, sophisticated investment vehicle.250

241. Greenwood & Schor, supra note 231, at 13 (finding non-Hedge Fund
shareholders have a twenty-one month median holding period compared to a four
month Hedge Fund holding period).
242. Bratton, supra note 79, at 1412–13 (empirically finding that Activist Hedge
Funds often hold stakes for one to two years); Brav et al., supra note 85, at 1731–32
(finding evidence of twelve month holding period but considering the data incomplete
and arguing that the actual holding period is closer to twenty or twenty-two months).
243. Compare supra note 241 with supra note 242.
244. See generally supra Part IV.C.
245. See supra notes 48–52, 168–72 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 175–90 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part IV.B.
249. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Parts II.B.–C. (discussing Hedge Fund strategies); see also Brav et
al., supra note 85, at 1773 (Hedge Fund managers “have very strong personal financial
incentives [because they are mainly paid based on performance] . . . and do not face the
regulatory or political barriers that limit the effectiveness of [institutional investors].”).
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E. INTRA-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICTS
Both Hedge Funds and Institutions sometimes advance their
economic interests at the possible expense of other shareholders’ wealth.
Hedge Funds commonly oppose other shareholders’ interests when they
engage in short-selling,251 use derivative contracts,252 or make
investment-decisions based on a unique bundle of ownership interests.253
Hedge Funds initiating litigation or media campaigns to protect short
positions can also be at odds with other investors.254 Similarly,
Institutions can negatively affect other shareholders by opposing
corporate initiatives for Institution-specific business reasons,255
pressuring company management to support an Institution-favored
political agenda,256 or determining whether or not to vote for a merger
based on optimizing their aggregate economic interests.257
V. HOW DOES THIS ANALYSIS COMPLEMENT OR
REBUT EXISTING TAKEOVER ANALYSIS?
Part V considers how the dissimilar preferences and incentives of
Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors both complement and rebut
existing takeover analysis. Section A compares the findings in Part IV
to academic commentary that seeks to explain when mergers should be
consummated. Section B argues that, despite its reservations, the Airgas
court’s protection of the poison pill was the optimal conclusion in light
of existing evidence.
A. THE ACADEMIC CASE FOR REFORM LACKS SUPPORT
The preceding framework of dissimilar shareholder economic
interests258 closely matches models offered by leading takeover
jurisprudence scholars Martin Lipton259 and Lucian Bebchuk,260 as well
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107–22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 209–15 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Part IV.B.
Martin Lipton is a Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz LLP. See Martin
Lipton, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/Thread/
Attorneys/SubThread/Search/Name/Lipton, Martin.
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as by behavioral finance theorists.261 These paradigms contradict262
Frank Easterbrook’s263 corporate governance model of “homogenous”
shareholders exhibiting preferences that are “likely to be similar if not
identical.”264 Lipton conceives shareholders as a diverse body affected
by different investment horizons,265 constituency obligations,266 and
other investor-specific motives.267 Similarly, Bebchuk’s academic work
discusses shareholders’ incongruent holding periods268 and pursuit of
special interests.269

260. Lucian Arye Bebchuk is a Professor at Harvard Law School. See Professor
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Faculty/
bebchuk/.
261. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers
and Acquisitions, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 65 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets
Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, And Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L.
REV. 611 (1995).
262. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the
Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 462–64 (2005) (discussing and rejecting the
assumption of shareholder homogeneity); see also supra Parts IV.B.-D.
263. Frank Easterbrook is Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer in Law at The University of Chicago Law School.
Frank Easterbrook—Biography, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/easterbrook.
264. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 405 (1983).
265. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93
VA. L. REV. 733, 746 (2007) (“[C]ertain vocal shareholders, notably hedge funds and
arbitrageurs, invest over much shorter time horizons . . . and they accordingly favor a
short-term spike in the share price over long-term wealth creation.”).
266. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 68 (2003)
(“[S]hareholders are a diverse and ever-shifting group of people and institutions, with
differing interests and, in the case of institutional investors, differing obligations to their
own diverse constituencies.”); see also Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 468–72 (1991)
(discussing institutional investor conflicts of interest).
267. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 266, at 78–79 (“Shareholders with ‘social
causes’ regularly use governance as a mean to promote those causes.”); cf. Anabtawi,
supra note 104, at 577–93 (discussing divergent shareholder interests).
268. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 723–24 (2007) (addressing the risks associated with shareholders’ short-term
biases).
269. Id. at 720–22 (discussing the effect of shareholders’ pursuit of special
interests).
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Yet even Lipton and Bebchuck disagree about how shareholder
wealth is affected by disparate shareholder interests. Lipton contends
that self-interested shareholders encourage companies to prefer shortterm earnings increases to long-term value creation.270 Bebchuk offers a
different view. He does not dispute the risk of short-term shareholders
negatively influencing companies and incentivizing directors to prefer
short-term earnings increases,271 but contends that differences between
shareholders’ economic interests do not cause negative wealth effects,
and that a company’s adoption of shareholder-preferred measures is
value-enhancing.272 Moreover, he argues that the greatest risk to
shareholder wealth is not short-term-biased shareholders’ influence on
management, but the risk that inadequately monitored directors will fail
to effectively pursue long-term wealth creation.273
Ultimately, Bebchuk and Lipton disagree about how the law should
treat hostile takeovers in order to optimize shareholder wealth. Lipton
favors the current regime. Since courts essentially defer to boards that
reject hostile bids, directors are largely insulated from shareholder
influence.274 But in Bebchuk’s view, the choice should belong to
shareholders because “[they] have the best incentives.”275 Indeed,
Bebchuk argues that companies defeating premium tender offers fail to
270. See Lipton & Savitt, supra note 265, at 733 (“[T]ransfer[ing] the basic
responsibility of corporate management from directors to shareholders . . . would leave
management and directors subservient to [their] whims . . . no matter how . . . selfserving . . . parochial . . . inconsistent with long-term corporate performance, and . . .
destructive to the economy as a whole.”).
271. See Bebchuk, supra note 268, at 723 (“The strongest objection to election
reform comes from concerns about short-termism. The fear of being replaced, it might
be argued, could lead boards seeking to please shareholders to take actions that improve
short-term results but are not optimal from a long-term perspective.”); accord Lipton &
Savitt, supra note 265.
272. See Bebchuk, supra note 268, at 721 (“The only resolutions that systematically
obtain majority support are those calling for changes that are viewed as valueenhancing by a wide range of financial institutions – such as destaggering the board or
rescinding poison pills. In contrast, proposals that focus on social or special-interest
issues uniformly fall far short of a majority.”).
273. See id. at 724 (“Thus, the short-termism concern might justify providing boards
with periods of significant length during which they do not face a meaningful chance of
ouster. . . . While short-term insulation might induce directors to focus on long-term
performance, indefinite insulation would enable boards to deviate from focusing on
shareholder interests in both the short run and the long run.”).
274. See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 262.
275. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate
Transactions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 1004 (2002).
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produce worthwhile long-term returns.276 Thus, he favors weakening
takeover defenses and expanding shareholder power in two ways:
governance reforms incentivizing directors to advance shareholder
interests277 and limiting directors’ takeover obligations to providing
shareholders adequate information to make an informed decision.278
However, there is reason to doubt Bebchuk’s claim that
shareholders would be better off if they were permitted to vote in favor
of hostile takeover bids. At first, shareholders may benefit. A more
takeover-friendly legal regime presumably increases takeover attempts
and successes. Relaxing takeover restrictions also should, at first,
increase the likelihood that activist strategies result in takeovers. Even
though activists typically hold small interests in target companies,279
constraining board influence should improve takeover prospects despite
activists’ low voting power. Perceiving greater certainty in takeover
consummation, merger arbitrageurs should contribute to this effect by
investing in takeovers in greater numbers.280 Activism could also
become a greater determinant in other shareholders’ returns because of
its higher incidences of success. While there is only mixed evidence
that activism benefits shareholders generally281—and it increases return

276. Lucian Bebchuk, Op-Ed., An Antidote for the Corporate Poison Pill, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 24, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044766045761582
11261083194.html (“[T]he empirical evidence indicates that when directors use their
power to block offers, it often proves detrimental to shareholder interests. . . . [B]oards
that defeated premium offers failed on average, even in the long run, to produce returns
for their shareholders that made remaining independent worthwhile.”); see also Bernard
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 551 (“Defeat of a hostile bid is, on average, bad
for the target’s shareholders . . . . [If] targets that remain independent have hidden value
on their own, there is no evidence of this over the two or three year period that the
available studies cover.”).
277.
Bebchuk, supra note 268, at 729 (“[P]reventing incumbents from blocking
hostile offers” and “facilitat[ing] removal of directors by shareholders via the ballot
box” are complementary policies that “reinforce each other and both operate to make
boards more accountable and more attentive to shareholder interests.”); see also Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
409 (2005) (concluding that “staggered boards are associated with an economically
meaningful reduction in firm value”).
278. See Bebchuk, supra note 275, at 1001–02.
279. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part IV.A.
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volatility282—activist strategies resulting in takeovers positively affect
shareholder wealth.283 Thus, increasing the likelihood of takeover
successes should have initial positive effects on shareholder wealth.
However, Hedge Funds employ a multitude of strategies and are
generally sufficiently flexible to be able to allocate funds into emerging
opportunities.284 Because of this feature, any increased activist strategy
returns could simply attract new capital into the strategy in search of
increased expected return, bringing about a new risk and return
equilibrium that ultimately lowers expected returns. The ultimate
consequences for shareholders’ economic interests cannot be precisely
quantified beyond these broad strokes. And it cannot be said with any
certainty, as Bebchuk contends, that weakening takeover defenses will
generate positive aggregate shareholder wealth effects given the
uncertain relationship between shareholders’ economic interests.285
There is also reason to heed Lipton’s warning that empowering
shareholders will distort economic returns and destroy long-term
value.286 A more relaxed takeover regime may exacerbate existing intrashareholder conflicts among all holders of stock.287 Both Hedge Funds
and Institutions sometimes advance their economic interests while
negatively affecting other shareholders, such as retail investors, holder
of beneficial interests of Institutional Investors, and any other holders of
stock.288 This concern is particularly acute when we consider the case of
Hedge Funds, which have the ability to create unique exposures that
often create economic interests that are diametrically opposed to those
of diverse, unaffiliated shareholders and can be opposed to Institutional
Investors interests, and the interests of their beneficiaries.289 A more
relaxed takeover regime may also exacerbate Hedge Funds’ and
Institutions’ short-term biases and negatively affect retail investors, the
holders of beneficial interests of Institutional Investors and any other
holders of stock.290 Ultimately, both shareholder conflict and short-term
282.
283.

See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.A.
See supra note 94. But see supra Part IV.A., discussing increased volatility
resulting from activist strategies.
284. See supra note 54. See generally supra Part II, describing Hedge Funds and
their investment strategies.
285. See supra Part IV.
286. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
287. See generally supra Part IV.E., describing intra-shareholder conflicts.
288. See generally supra Part IV.E.
289. See supra notes 107–22 and accompanying text.
290. See generally supra Parts IV.C–D.
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bias considerations weigh against the case for empowering shareholders
as a group to decide their fates in the context of mergers because of the
outsized influence of Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors.
B. THE AIRGAS COURT REACHED THE RIGHT CONCLUSION
Delaware courts have expressed skepticism at the idea that
shareholders’ short-term preferences might outweigh their interests in
long-term value: in Airgas,291 the court wondered whether there was
sufficient evidence to suggest that Airgas stockholders were so
motivated by short-term considerations to “‘take a smaller harvest in the
swelter of August over a larger one in Indian Summer?”292 In Mercier v.
Inter-Tel,293 Vice Chancellor Strine similarly expressed skepticism that
Hedge Funds would accept a lower price in a merger transaction than
they believed the company to be worth in the proposed alternative
transactions.294 Strine noted his reluctance to grant an injunction based
on there being “good” shareholders and “bad short-term”
shareholders.295 Despite the Chancery Court’s doubts that shareholders
have disparate economic incentives, in each case,296 the court held that
the target board’s actions satisfied Unocal’s enhanced standard.297
Furthermore, since Unocal jurisprudence permits board decisionmaking premised upon shareholders’ variable economic incentives,
Delaware’s takeover regime is thus aligned with empirical evidence
291.
292.

16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
Id. at 111 (quoting Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del.
Ch. 2007)).
293. 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007).
294. See id. at 815 (“Buttressing an injunction on the notion that these investors
would take a smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian
Summer is not something this record supports. Sophisticated short-term traders can reap
profits from a variety of scenarios.”).
295. Id. at 814.
296. In Mercier, the court held that the target board acted reasonably and in good
faith to maximize value for the shareholders, id. at 819, when the board changed the
record date for an upcoming merger vote, in part to encourage merger arbitrageur
purchases. The action was not disproportionate or coercive because shareholders could
still vote no. Id. at 816.
297. This result is not surprising.
Unocal’s first prong is a deferential
reasonableness test, see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text, and a board’s
reliance on a less than certain premise, without more, is insufficient for the first part of
the test not to be satisfied.
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demonstrating that not all shareholders are motivated by capturing longterm value.298 For example, merger arbitrageurs exhibit extremely
strong short-term biases as the strategy eschews long-term value by
design.299 Activist Hedge Funds also show mixed effects of short-term
biases.300 Even Institutions exhibit short-term preferences.301 Most
importantly, both risk-averse merger arbitrage302 and risk-heavy activist
strategies303 are incentivized to vote in favor of mergers and lock in
gains.
Thus, the Airgas court’s decision to approve maintenance of the
poison pill in light of the threat posed by short-term investors to other
shareholders’ interests304 reflects empirical data about shareholders’
preferences and incentives, and preserves a target board’s capacity to act
upon this data.305 Furthermore, preserving the formidable anti-takeover
effect of existing Unocal jurisprudence is supported by these same
empirical considerations and any potentially negative consequences of
relaxing takeover defenses.306
CONCLUSION
This Note establishes that Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors
generally have different preferences and incentives in takeovers.
Consequently, this Note concludes that the Airgas court correctly
determined that Unocal permits a target board to maintain their poison
pill to protect certain shareholders whose economic interests are
threatened by Hedge Funds tendering into potentially inadequate bids.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See supra Parts II, III, and IV.
See supra notes 130–31, 133–34, 239 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130–31, 133–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 111–12.
See generally supra Parts IV.A–E.
See, e.g., supra Part V.A., discussing potential unintended consequences
resulting from relaxing takeover defenses.

